Security by design.
Not damage control.
~70% of serious security bugs in Chromium are memory-safety problems [C21, 2026-10-15]. Safe Rust rules out that class of bug.
Where the risk actually lives
A feature-by-feature look at the parts of a PDF reader that attackers target — and how PDFluent's choices compare with a traditional C++ engine like Adobe Acrobat. Adobe-side points are general, historical industry facts.
The sandbox fallacy
A sandbox is a wall built around unsafe code. Acrobat needs a strong one precisely because its C++ core is memory-unsafe by construction. PDFluent takes the opposite route: the parser, interpreter and highest-risk decoders are written in Rust, whose safe subset rules out that class of memory bug at the source. Reducing risk at the source beats containing it after the fact.
Zero-click dangers
The most dangerous PDF exploits need no interaction at all — opening the file is enough. FORCEDENTRY abused a JBIG2 image decoder; others ride embedded fonts or automatic actions. PDFluent decodes images and fonts in safe Rust, ignores /OpenAction and /AA entirely, and does not execute scripts found in documents. Opening a file does just that.
Privacy in a cloud age
PDF tools can contact the network through OCSP checks, cloud storage, form submission and telemetry. Each is a channel a document can use to phone home. PDFluent is offline-first: document content never goes over the network, and the PDF engine has no path to an HTTP client. What you process stays on your machine.
Your document is uploaded to a server you don't control before you can work on it.
Every operation runs on your machine. There is no upload step, because there is nowhere to upload to.
Limits you can verify, not promises you take on faith
#![forbid(unsafe_code)] in pdf-interpret, pdf-font, hayro-jbig2 and hayro-jpeg2000).Questions and answers
- Does PDFluent run JavaScript from a PDF?
- No. PDFluent does not execute scripts found in documents, and it ignores /OpenAction and /AA entirely, so opening a file does just that.
- Can a PDF phone home when I open it in PDFluent?
- No. Document content never goes over the network, and the PDF engine has no path to an HTTP client. Crash reports stay off unless you switch them on yourself.
- Does PDFluent upload my files?
- No. Every operation runs on your machine. There is no upload step, because there is nowhere to upload to.
- Why is PDFluent written in Rust?
- Safe Rust rules out memory-safety bugs at the source. The Chromium project reports that around 70% of its serious security bugs are memory-safety problems [C21, 2026-10-15]. The parser, interpreter and highest-risk decoders are written in Rust.
- How does PDFluent handle image and font decoders, the usual zero-click route?
- It decodes images and fonts in safe Rust. The interpreter and the highest-risk decoders forbid unsafe code outright (#![forbid(unsafe_code)] in pdf-interpret, pdf-font, hayro-jbig2 and hayro-jpeg2000).
- How can I check these claims myself?
- Watch the app with a network monitor while you work on a document. The verify page at /verify/ shows how.
A PDF editor that earns its trust.
Free for everyone, including at work. Runs entirely on your machine. No account, no cloud, and no telemetry unless you switch on crash reports yourself.